Seidmann and Stein's elegant game-theoretic construct avails them little, however, because their premises, methodology, and conclusion do not mirror reality. Though their theory predicts that rational suspects will remain silent, roughly eighty to ninety percent of suspects talk to the police.
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Seidmann and Stein acknowledge this fact but dismiss it as irrational behavior, because in their view rational suspects would remain silent in preparation for trial.: 1 They succumb to the temptation to ignore messy fa cts that do not fit their neat theoretical model. They, like most criminal procedure scholars, mistakenly view trials as the center of the universe and assume that rational suspects should care mainly about maximizing their chances of success at trial. 4 This academic obsession with trials bears little.
relationship to the real world, _ where only about 6% of felony defendants go to trial and most plead guilty." We live in a world of guilty pleas, not tria ls, and in this world suspects have many options more desirable than fighti ng the government's case at trial. Suspects who think that they can divert suspicion may throw off the scent by concocting alibis. Those who expect to be convicted can earn favorable plea bargains by confessing early and perhaps doing undercover work against their co-conspirators. For most suspects, these other options are more attractive than remaining silent and gambling everything on a small chance of acquittal at trial.
In short, Seidmann and Stein err in viewing interrogation as a mere prelude to the inevitable trial and focusing on the latter. Instead, I will focus on the interrogation in its own right and the two options that Seidmann and to fighting the government at trial. They rely on an overly theoretical methodology and incorrect assumptions about the costs and benefits of confessing. As a result, they conclude that guilty defendants will remain silent, when in fact most defendants talk. Seidmann and Stein's theoretical approach typifies criminal procedure's broader, outmoded preoccupation with trials and its failure to focus on the real world.
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/rl. at 442-47 (discussing at length ho1,· damaging at trial silence would be, how triers of f�1ct 1\·ould interpret iL. and how it would affect a suspect's entire trial strate g y).
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See BL-REAI.' OF jt'ST!CE ST.-\TISTICS, L'.S. DEP'T OF jL:STICE, SOLRC:EBOOK OF CRI�II'\;.-\L JLSTICE ST->.TISTICS 1999, at 460 tbl.5.b2 (reponing that a 1996 sun-ey of the seven c:·-five largest urba n counties in Amerie<t found that only l% of state felony defendants 1vere acquitted after trial, 5% \\·ere comicted at trial, the cases of �9% were dismissed, and 66% pleaded guilty (the tutals do not add up to 100% because of rounding)); irl. at '132 tbl.S.32 (reporting that in 1999 only 1.4% of federal felony defendants were acqui tted after trial, 4.3% were com1cted after trial, the cases of 10.4% ,,·ere dismissed, ancl83.9% pleaded guilty or nolo contendere). confessions are good not only for society but also for guilt:;-defendants, because confessions are virtuous and promote both 'justice and rehabilitation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,538 (1966) (\Vhite,J., dissenting) (noting that confession, far from hurting the suspect, "may provide ps;·chological relief and enhance the prospects for rehabilitation'').
I. To TELL THE TRUTH

17.
See U.S. SENTE'.;C!i'\G GL'IDELI:\ES lVL-1.:
(making timeliness of confessions a criterion for sentence redttctions); George E. Dix, Promises,
Confessions, and H'ayne LaFave's Bright Line Rule A n a(nis, 1993 U. ILL. L. RE\·. 207, 247 (1993) (explaining that sentencing judges may give greater ll'eight to prompt cooperation, as earlier cooperation is more likely to lead to additional information in time for officers to use it, whereas late cooperation may be redundant once police have developed other sources of information independently).
used for pretrial detention are often less pleasant than the prisons used ·for lon ger-term incarceration, defendants may prefer quick resolutions. 18
Early confessions bring particular benefits in multi-defendant cases g from car-theft rings to fraud conspiracies to robbery gangs to dru g cartels. For example, a low-level drug courier who is arrested may and agree to cooperate in the investigation of her co-conspirators.
t to make it work, the courier must admit guilt, and often she must do so t away. 19 Once she does so, she may be able to deliver the drugs she was · g to the intended recipient, giving police surveillance valuable evid ence and perhaps leading to more arrests. She may also place recorded teleph one conversations with others in the organization. She may even wear body recorder and microphone to tape-record meetings in person, acting a5 a government informant for some time. All of these activities will earn her substa ntial credit come sentencing time, and they are virtually the only way that she can reduce the otherwise stiff drug penalties. �0
HOW THE COURTS REFOR\!ED A\!ERICA'S PR!SO:\S 111 (1998); see aLso HU!AN RIGHTS WATCH, PRlSG:'.J CO'lDIT!ONS 1:\ THE Ll:\ITED ST.-\TES 18-22 (1991) (noting that some jails are overcrowded, and because they are for short-term incarceration they often lack recreation facilities, windows, privacy, and classitication of inmates). Large dormitory-style jail cells are particularly unpleasant and make it easier for inmates to attack and sodomize each other. ld. at 26.
19.
See Dix, supm note 17, at 247 ("For a variety of reasons, and perhaps especially in dntg cases, officers may be \villing to 'deal' with a suspect only if the suspect is willing to deal immediately, with the otlicers, and without consulting counsel or others," because such deals are timely, flexible, and preserve contidentiality.); see also jAMES Q. WILSO:\, THE . INVESTIGATORS: MAI\AGI:\C F.B.I. ,\ND !\.\RC:OTICS AGEYfS 73-74 (1978) (explaining that the hours between arrest and arraignment are the critical time during which agents are best able to flip suspects and use them in ongoing investigations).
The confession is an important prelude to cooperation for three reasons. First, it is simply implausible to imagine someone who simultaneously denies guilt while going through the motions of continuing to take part in the denied crime. Second, if the courier is denying her innocence, she may avoid discussing her incriminating knowledge during taped conversations. This would greatly reduce the likelihood that she would elicit incriminating statemenl� from others and that she would steer the police towards evidence that incriminates others as well as herself. Indeed, her stilted conversations might even tip off her co-conspirators that something 11·as \\Tong. Third, confession is central to airing the facts in preparation for testimony at trial. Cooperating witnesses must be prepared to testify fully about the crime and their roles in it. To demonstrate candor, a IV·itness must come completely clean before the jury. The witness is even more credible if she confessed her involvement right awav to the police.
20.
18 LT.S.C. § 3SS3(e) (2000) (authorizing sentencingjuclges to depart below manclatmv minimum sentences for defendants who furnish "substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecutio n" of other criminals, on rnotion of the government); U.S. widespread confessions, cooperation, and guilty pleas . The point is that many suspects who can expect to be found guilty confess because they know that going to trial, let alone winning at trial, is not realistic. They understandably prefer the bird in the hand (the benefits of confession) to the bird in the bush (a slim chance of an acquittal at trial). Suspects are too savvy to pin all their hopes on trials that exist only in theory.
II. 
32.
See Leo, supra note 15, at 275 (noting that 58% of those questioned had felony records, 29% had misdemeanor records, and 13% had no records); cf id. at 287 tbl.9 (noting that 69.90% of those with felony records, 89.36% of those with misdemeanor records, and 91.67% of those with no criminal records waived their Mi· randa rights). While experience \\�th the criminal justice system does reduce the percentage of suspects who speak to the police somewhat, a solid majority of the most experienced criminals still think it is in their interests to speak. [2003] not divert suspicion, however, the investigation is likely to be the end of the story. Police assume that suspects remain silent because they are guilty and cannot exculpate themselves, in contrast to the many defendants who already proffer alibis. Police and prosecutors have strong incentives and pressures to secure large numbers of convictions. So, once a suspect remains silent and thereby confirms the police's suspicion that he is guilty, police use many tools to find more proof of guilt. The police can conduct surveillance of every move he makes. They can show him to witnesses in line-ups or photographic arrays. They can target his friends and associates and pressure them to give evidence against him. Prosecutors can subpoena his telephone records, bank statements, and credit card bills for evidence. They can keep track of the telephone numbers he calls and the mail he receives, and can perhaps wiretap telephones to record incriminating conversations. In short, once the government focuses on a target, it can often build an overwhelming case. This helps to explain why only about 1% of felony defendants are acquitted at trial; most plead guilty.
33 Most suspects are right not to worry about damaging their cases at trial, because their chances of going to trial and winning are so small.
Put another way, Seidmann and Stein's claim is that the right induces guilty suspects to remain silent, because they know that juries will not infer guilt from silence (though police will). Without a right to remain silent, they claim, guilty suspects would concoct (credible) false alibis, leading juries to discount innocent suspects' alibis. 34 But why would those who could concoct credible alibis refrain from doing so, if alibis are so rarely refuted (as argued below)? The argument further supposes that guilty suspects care most about maximizing their chances of winning at trial, when in fact trials are rare and guilty suspects know it. Because trials are won or lost at the investigative stage, few cases are worth pushing to a trial where the no-adverse-inference rule might make a difference. Seidmann and Stein's entire argument hinges on the inferences that juries might draw at trial, when in 94% of cases there will never be a trial.
vVhile silence is often not as attractive an option as Seidmann and Stein
33.
See supra note 5 (collecting statistics). While it is true that a fraction of cases is dismissed, the possibility of dismissal is hardly a reason for suspects to remain silent instead of lying. First, on Seidmann and Stein's model, the right to remain silent confers an added benefit only at trial, by preventingjuries from drawing ach·erse inferences. Before trial. police and other actors are free to draw adverse inferences from suspects' silence, regardless of 1\'hether there is a right to remain silent. If the case never makes it w trial, there is no jur)' to draw an adYerse inference, and the right has no effect. Thus, the right protects guilry suspects onl y in the fewer than 6% of cases that go to trial; it has no effect on dismissals. Second. as the text goes on w note, false alibis in practice do not come back to haunt suspects. If anything, plausible lies are more likely to lead the government not to charge or to dismiss cases \\'here guilt is doubtful. In contrast, silence would only conlirm the defendant's guilt and steel the goYernment's determination to convict.
34.
Seidmann & Stein, sujnn note 1, at 465-70.
make it out to be, lies are even more attractive than they suggest. Lies are not nearly as damaging as Seidmann and Stein assume, because they are unlik ely to be disproved. A recent empirical study found that while 79 out of 173 interrogated suspects made non-incriminating statements, not a single suspect was locked into a demonstrably false alibi. 35 Once again, Seidmann and Stein fail to modify their theory to reflect these facts.
Suspects in white-collar crimes have particular reasons to lie instead of r emaining silent in anticipation of trial. For reputable business executives and professionals, merely being indicted is enough to besmirch their reputations and harm their livelihoods. 36 Avoiding indictment is the name of the game, and they will do whatever it takes-either telling the truth and making a quick deal or lying to divert suspicion. Silence is often the absolute worst option, as it \vill lead not only to indictment but also to search warrants and subpoenas. This further investigation will almost certainly turn up incriminating evidence, because white-collar cases turn on business records and paper trails. :17
True, lying has its risks. The police may be able to disprove lies, especially grandiose alibis, which vvill hurt the suspect. As noted, however, this outcome is not nearly as common as Seidmann and Stein suppose.
Seidmann and Stein use a hypothetical example in which an eyewitness remembers seeing the suspect at some time, but is confused about whether it was at the crime scene or on another occasion. To counter this identif ication evidence, the guilty suspect can guess at another, innocent occasion on which the witness says she might have seen the suspect. The assume that those who talk are tellmg the truth. -But m a world where few defendants find it advantageous to press on to jury trials, convincing the police matters fa r more than convincing the jury. This explains why 80% to .
90% talk. And in a world where 80% to 90% of suspects talk, talk is cheap.
Some guilty suspects choose to remain silent, but many more talk, mimicking innocent defendants and so leading juries and police to distrus t:
all alibis.
�
The 10% to 20% of suspects who remain silent may benefit from the right to silence, but the spillover effect of this silence is negligible. Doubtless .
some of these silent suspects are guilty. Innocent suspects may also remain silent, however, either because they lack strong alibis or because they fear 39. See supra note 5 (collecting statistics on rates of acquittals and convi ctions at trial); Stephanos Bibas, Ju dicial Fa ct-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a Wo n',:l of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE Lj. 1097 , 1150 , 1153 -54 (2001 .
Lies might also be relevant if they made plea bargains less favorable (or if, conversely, silence made plea bargains more fav orable) . But given that lies are so rarely disproved, there is little reason to think that they lead to plea bargains that are harsh er than those fo llowi ng silence.
40.
Seidrnann & Stein, supra note 1, at 467-70.
.
See, e.g, NJ. Cr. R. 3:13-3 (b) (explai ning that discovery is not ordinarily due until fourteen days after indictment) . . and respond to fine gradations in pooling phenomena, and ij one assumes that jurors wi ll draw inferences in favor of testifying defendants but not adverse inferences against silent defendants, perhaps a few jurors might theoreti cally trust alibis sl i ghtly more, but any such effect seems exceedingly speculative and negligible. Any such effect is a far cry fr om the large, si gn i fican t effect claimed by Seidmann and Stein. And to the extent that jurors draw fa vorable inferences ' ; from alibis, they are likely to draw correspondingly unfavorable inferences fr om silence. This would undercut any incentive to remain silent and so induce silent suspects to speak, which would unravel the supposed anti-pooling effect.
44. Seidmann and Stein assume wi thout argument that juries know th ey sh ould trust alibis because they somehow know that guilty defendants will remain silent. :: ;ee Seidmann & Stein. supra note I, at 469 (" [T] he jury dra\VS a favorable inference from anv ex cui patory statement.").
This assumpti on does not square with my ovv11 experiences as a fe deral prosecutor. In various Westlaw searches through the jury-instructions database Ul-ALL) on October 5, 2002, 1 fo und not a single pattern jury instruction to that effect. Nor would an y juror wi th common sense assume that a defendant must be telli n g the truth. On the contrarY, judges instruct juri es to consider a witness's stake in the outcome in deciding whether or not to belie,·e that witness's testi m ony, and some explicitly tell jurors to judge defendants' testimony by the same srandarcls. with th e government, or otherwise striking a favorable plea bargain will be much more attractive than trial. Thus, many talk and fe w stay silent.
This messy reality lacks the theoretical elegance and beauty of Seidmann and Stein's model. For example, it requires exploring the incentives to confess created by stiff drug sentences and the Sentencing
Guidelines ' cooperation and acceptance-of-responsibility provisions. But the messy model explains the data much better than the elegant one does.
Beauty is not always truth , nor tru th , beauty. It is time to stop assuming that every criminal case ends in a jury trial and to heed facts that undercut th eories. V\7e must scrutinize how police, prosecutors, defense counsel, and suspects respond to multifarious incentives in th e real world and tailor our th eories to fit these fa cts.
45.
Sn: Ribas, sujHa note 39.
